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  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1130 
___________ 
 
ROBERT RAMIREZ-OLORTIGUE, 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
          Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A075-547-292) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 24, 2013 
Before:  VANASKIE, COWEN and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Robert Ramirez-Olortigue petitions for review of a final order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying 
his application for cancellation of removal.  We will deny the petition for review. 
 Ramirez-Olortigue is a citizen of Peru.  He arrived in the United States in 1995; on 
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January 30, 1998, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served him 
with a notice to appear, charging that he was removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien who 
was present in the United States without being admitted.   
 On August 13, 1998, Ramirez-Olortigue appeared before an IJ.  During that 
hearing, the government and Ramirez-Olortigue’s counsel agreed to remand the case to 
the INS’s District Director to consider whether Ramirez-Olortigue should be granted 
permanent-resident status based on his marriage to a United States citizen.  The IJ 
therefore entered an order remanding the case; the order provided that “if the action taken 
by the District Director is favorable to [Ramirez-Olortigue], the pending deportation 
proceedings shall be terminated; but . . . if the action taken by the District Director is not 
favorable to [Ramirez-Olortigue] the pending deportation proceedings shall remain in full 
force and effect.”  
 After the case was remanded, Ramirez-Olortigue separated from his then-wife, 
and consequently abandoned his adjustment-of-status application.  The INS then filed a 
motion to re-calendar the case before the IJ, which was granted.  Ramirez-Olortigue did 
not appear at the rescheduled hearing, and the IJ ordered him removed in absentia. 
 In 2007, Ramirez-Olortigue sought to reopen his proceedings.  He claimed that he 
did not receive the INS’s motion to re-calendar, and explained that he did not believe that 
he had been required to provide change-of-address information to the Immigration Court 
because, to his mind, his proceedings had been conclusively terminated when the IJ 
remanded the action in 1998.  The IJ denied the motion to reopen, but the BIA reversed, 
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concluding that Ramirez-Olortigue’s mistake about his obligations was reasonable and 
that he should be given the opportunity to have an IJ consider the merits of his defenses 
to removability. 
 In September 2008, Ramirez-Olortigue appeared before the IJ in his reopened 
action.  After proceedings not relevant here, Ramirez-Olortigue conceded removability 
but sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), which permits the 
Attorney General to cancel the removal of an alien who, in addition to meeting other 
requirements, “has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of 
not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application.”  The IJ 
rejected the application on the ground that the continuous-residence period ends when an 
alien is served with a notice to appear, and Ramirez-Olortigue was served with such a 
notice less than three years after he arrived.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d).  The BIA affirmed, 
and Ramirez-Olortigue then filed a timely petition for review to this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  In reviewing Ramirez-
Olortigue’s request for cancellation of removal, we may consider constitutional claims 
and questions of law, but not factual or discretionary determinations.  Pareja v. Att’y 
Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review legal questions de novo, but “defer to 
the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of statutes it is charged with administering.”  Arca-
Pineda v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2008).  Because the BIA issued its own 
opinion, we review its decision rather than the IJ’s.  Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 
339 (3d Cir. 2012).     
 We discern no error in the BIA’s decision.  As the BIA noted, to be eligible for 
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cancellation of removal, the alien must meet the ten-year continuous-presence 
requirement; moreover, under the so-called “stop-time rule,” the count of time toward the 
ten-year requirement stops upon service of a notice to appear.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1), (d).  There is no dispute that Ramirez-Olortigue was served with a notice 
to appear less than three years after arriving in the United States.  See generally Briseno-
Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2007). 
While Ramirez-Olortigue acknowledges that he was served with a notice to appear 
before he had resided in the United States for ten years, he argues that an exception to the 
stop-time rule is available here.  In support of this argument, he relies on In re Cisneros-
Gonzalez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668, 672 (BIA 2004), where the BIA held that the notice to 
appear referred to in the stop-time rule “pertains only to the charging document served in 
the proceedings in which the alien applies for cancellation of removal, and not to 
charging documents served on the alien in prior proceedings.”  Ramirez-Olortigue 
contends that in his case, the initial notice to appear was dismissed, and that he has 
continuously resided in the United States for ten years since that dismissal.   
Ramirez-Olortigue’s argument lacks merit.  Even assuming that the continuous-
presence clock can restart after a notice to appear has been finally dismissed — an issue 
on which we express no position here — we have squarely held that the clock does not 
restart after a mere “administrative closure.”  See Arca-Pineda, 527 F.3d at 104-05.  As 
we explained in Arca-Pineda, administrative closure is a “procedural convenience that 
may be granted if both parties to the removal proceedings agree, but it does not constitute 
a final order”; rather, administrative closure merely “temporarily removes a case from the 
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immigration judge’s calendar.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, rather than being finally terminated, the proceedings in Ramirez-Olortigue’s 
case were administratively closed.  As noted above, based on agreement between 
Ramirez-Olortigue’s counsel and the government, Ramirez-Olortigue’s case was 
removed from the IJ’s calendar so that he could pursue relief based on his marriage to a 
United States citizen.  The IJ’s order specifically stated that the order was not final, 
explaining that “if the action taken by the District Director is not favorable to [Ramirez-
Olortigue] the pending deportation proceedings shall remain in full force and effect.”  
Then, after Ramirez-Olortigue abandoned his application for permanent residence, the 
government re-calendared the initial action — just as provided for in the order — rather 
than initiating a new case.  Therefore, Ramirez-Olortigue’s action was administratively 
closed, not dismissed, and Arca-Pineda forecloses his argument.  See generally In re 
Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 696 (BIA 2012) (noting that it is appropriate for IJs to 
use administrative closure in similar situation).  We thus agree with the BIA that 
Ramirez-Olortigue cannot satisfy the continuous-residence requirement, which renders 
him ineligible for cancellation of removal.   
Accordingly, we will deny Ramirez-Olortigue’s petition for review.   
 
